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The “emergence”1 in recent decades of a group of large, rapidly growing developing 
countries—collectively known as the “BRICS”, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa—has generated a vast literature, though it is worth noting that interest in “rising” 
powers has not been confined to this group alone (see vom Hau, Scott and Hulme, 
2012).  Much of the literature has focused on the likely intentions of this group and the 
consequences of their emergence for established powers as well as for existing systems 
of global governance (Gray and Murphy, 2013).  While China’s rise has elicited the 
largest proportion and most critical commentary (see, for example, Yee and Feng, 2002; 
Kaplan, 2005; Mearsheimer, 2005; Kennedy, 2010) the other members of this group 
have also drawn notable attention (see also Macfarlane, 2006; Hurrell, 2008; Narlikar, 
2013; Taylor, 2014). 
 
In this debate, the role of emerging powers in the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
has figured prominently particularly in shaping aspects of the Doha round of 
multilateral trade negotiations (see, for instance, Hopewell, 2015).  This is perhaps 
unsurprising given that it has been through the realisation of trade-led growth strategies 
that many of these countries have “risen”.  Yet it is not just that these states have 
experienced dramatic and enviable rates of growth in recent years that has marked 
them out—notwithstanding the fact that they are all now facing serious economic 
problems.  It is also because of their control of energy supplies, importance in global 
food markets, dominance of production and consumption patterns, and resource 
acquisition strategies, among other things.  
 
                                                 
* Rorden Wilkinson is Professor of Global Political Economy and Chair of the Department of International 
Relations at the University of Sussex, UK. 
1 For a critique of the concepts of emerging and rising powers as well as of the construction of rising 
power threats see Broomfield, 2003; Mawdsley, 2008; Turner, 2009. 
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The four preceding papers in this special issue make important interventions into 
debate about the role of emerging powers in the WTO.  Individually they provide 
useful insights into the non-material and status accruing benefits of emerging power 
participation in the multilateral trading system (Rodrigues Vieira); the role of domestic 
interests in debates about dispute settlement reform (Mahrenbach); domestic and 
international coalition formation in agricultural trade politics (Singh and Gupta); and 
the role of emerging powers in brokering the first substantive deal to result from the 
Doha round at the WTO’s December 2013 Bali ministerial conference (Narlikar and 
Tussie).  In combination they add further weight to a growing body of literature that 
perceives the actions and activities of this latest generation of emerging powers as 
significant but nonetheless entirely consistent with the preservation of the status quo, 
and which sees international institutions as important mechanisms in facilitating their 
“peaceful rise” (Ikenberry, 2008). 
 
The purpose of this concluding contribution is to weave some of the insights from 
these papers, and the broader issues to which they speak, together with wider debate 
about emerging powers and the future of the multilateral trading system.  Its argument 
is that while the actions of this group have indeed left an indelible mark on the way 
multilateral trade is governed—and done so mostly for the better—the current 
generation of emerging powers has not been able to disrupt to any significant degree 
the deeper structures of power that underpin the WTO and the multilateral trading 
system more generally.  Most certainly China and India have proven to be important 
players in the Doha negotiations, particularly in the closing stages (as Narlikar and 
Tussie, Singh and Gupta, and Rodrigues Vieira, in this issue, all show).  They have, 
however, come up against a glass ceiling that prevents their further rise and which 
leaves the relations of power that underpin the multilateral trading system largely 
intact.  This ceiling is the product of a series of institutional factors that combine to 
facilitate alterations in the general arrangement of members one-to-another but which 
prevent deeper configurations of power from being disturbed.  Moreover, with the 
recent December 2015 decision to set aside the Doha negotiations in favour of 
plurilateral solutions to the pursuit of trade gains agreed at the WTO’s Nairobi 
ministerial conference, this glass ceiling has been reinforced.  The result is that while 
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we may have witnessed some changes in the multilateral trading system that have been 
brought about by the actions and activities of emerging powers, these changes have 
been more akin to a rearrangement of the multilateral furniture than to a fundamental 
transformation of that system. 
 
The paper develops its argument in three sections.  First, it explores briefly some of 
those institutional factors that mediated the “rise” of states in the multilateral trading 
system.  Second, it turns to the case of China to show how this institutional mediation 
has affected what western commentators have generally perceived to be the most 
significant (and, for some, the most threatening) of the current generation of rising 
powers as a complement to the forensic examinations of India and Brazil provided by 
the other contributions to this special issue.  Third, the paper reflects on how the 
conclusion of the WTO’s most recent Nairobi ministerial conference has fixed in place 
barriers to further elevation.  In the final section, the paper offers some concluding 
comments on the role of processes of institutional socialisation and the future of the 
multilateral trading system. 
 
Institutional factors 
It is worth bearing in mind that shifting relations of power have underpinned intense 
periods of politicking and debate across the history of the multilateral trading system.2  
These shifting relations of power have not, however, resulted in the introduction of 
substantive changes to the system’s overall design, functioning or governance, though 
they have ushered in adjustments that lend an appearance that substantive change has 
been brought about.  What they have produced instead is a re-arrangement of the 
relative position of trading powers with the most successful rising to key positions in 
decision-making fora, while others have fallen by the wayside.   
 
How has this happened?  The answer lies in the role that the multilateral trading system 
has played in shaping the behaviour of member-states in a way that has helped preserve 
the position of its most dominant powers while at the same time buying emerging 
powers into the system through a set of rules, norms and decision-making procedures 
                                                 
2 This section develops aspects of Wilkinson, 2014a. 
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that shape behaviour and expectations and which offer the prospect of beneficial 
participation through the giving of concessions.   
 
From the outset, the multilateral trading system’s core purpose has been to aid 
economic growth, expansion and innovation in core countries (primarily the USA but 
also its industrial allies—Brown, 1950; Gardner, 1956; Wilkinson, 2006a), while at the 
same time offering non-core countries (their developing and least developed 
counterparts) the prospect of real, but inevitably smaller gain.  Throughout the life 
cycle of the trade regime non-core countries have “risen’” and have appeared to offer a 
challenge to the existing set of underlying power relations.  This, in turn, has often 
resulted in the agreement of concessions designed to ensure their continued 
participation (Cox, 1996: 137-140; Keohane, 2002: 253; Wade, 2003: 632).  At the 
same time, however, it has always been the case that the rules, norms, practices and 
decision-making procedures embodied in the trade regime have helped socialise these 
countries into ways of operating that have ultimately assisted in reinforcing the status 
quo. 
 
Three institutional factors are important in this regard.  First, the entry of states into 
the trade regime has been heavily policed since the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) was first negotiated in 1947.  New entrants were either (i) 
“grandfathered” into the system during the institution’s early years if they were deemed 
to be of little economic and political significance or threat—as were the former colonies 
of the European powers—or else they faced exception clauses that nullified many of the 
benefits of membership, as was the case with Japan in 1955; or (ii) they were required 
to agree to significant and overly burdensome accession protocols that have become 
steadily more, rather than less, demanding over the institution’s lifecycle (Copelovitch 
and Ohls, 2012)—to which the accessions of both China and Vanuatu provide ample 
testimony. 
 
Second, the conduct of trade liberalisation in periodic rounds among small groups of 
economically significant states has enabled the leading industrial states to open markets 
in areas of economic benefit.  At the same time, it has enabled them to protect those of 
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political and economic sensitivity.  This has enabled those states involved in the 
negotiations to accrue trade benefits and to grow their economies at relatively greater 
rates than those that have not been involved in such a central manner.  The result has 
been to increase steadily overtime the relative gap between the trading fortunes of the 
most and least significant players in world trade through the negotiation of a series of 
asymmetrical trade bargains across the institution’s lifetime (see Wilkinson, 2006a).   
 
This unequal system has been consolidated further by the process by which past 
anomalies and imbalances are rectified.  Precisely because the mechanism for accruing 
trade advantages requires benefits to be received for concessions given away, any 
rectification of the asymmetries that have resulted from prior trade negotiations can 
only take place by non-core states agreeing to further concessions.  This, in turn, serves 
to actually widened rather than attenuated the gap between the advantages accrued to 
dominant and non-dominant states alike, generating an initial perception that 
rectification has been achieved but in reality creating a highly imbalanced layer-cake 
effect as the significance of the concessions given away is realised—as was recognised 
once the dust had settled after the Uruguay round (Ostry, 2007). 
 
Third, the multilateral trading system operates without transparent and steadfast rules 
of organisation, operation or method, relying instead on norm and practice—as well as 
knowledge of how those norms and practices work—for its functioning.  This extends 
from the selection of the head of the WTO’s Secretariat—the Director-General—to the 
composition of decision-making groups (which shift from one collective to another but 
which always comprise the USA and the EU) and the conduct of negotiations.  
Moreover, what codification there has been of these procedures over time has tended to 
entrench, rather than reform, norms and practices that continue to favour the leading 
industrial states.  The result is that the rules of the game often lack transparency and 
can (and do) change as negotiations unfold (Jawara and Kwa, 2003). 
 
Japan’s engagement with the GATT provides a good example of the experience of a 
previous generation emerging power and the significance of these institutional factors. 
Japan’s rapid industrialisation in the late 1940s and early 1950s coupled with the 
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relatively cheap price of its labour generated fears of that its goods would cause “market 
disruption” by dramatically outcompeting western products (particularly in textile and 
clothing production—see Patterson, 1966: 272-300).  These fears, in turn, generated 
significant opposition towards Japan’s application to accede to the GATT despite 
strong US support.  Much of this opposition came from the United Kingdom as the 
country that stood the most to lose from the removal of trade barriers.  When Japan 
finally acceded to the GATT, 40 per cent of the contracting parties—numbering 14 at 
the time—invoked a non-application clause (Article XXXV) enabling them to withhold 
all institutional benefits.  The result was to nullify the value of most-favoured-nation 
access into key European and other markets.  Japan’s response was to try to reverse the 
situation by developing a legal expertise to combat what it saw as unfair discrimination.  
The decision to respond in this way played a significant role in shaping Japanese 
commercial diplomacy around what Araki Ichirō (2007) has termed an “aggressive 
legalism”.   
 
What is important here is that the manner in which Japan acceded to the GATT and 
its experience of being part of the institution immediately thereafter shaped much of its 
subsequent commercial diplomacy.  Rather than try to use its growing economic power 
as a force to change the institution—that is, to be a system challenging power—it sought 
instead to use existing rules and procedures as a means of securing redress.  In this way, 
Japan’s multilateral commercial diplomacy was, from the outset, status quo orientated.   
 
Once Japan had acceded to the GATT, its growing economic significance, combined 
with the economic opportunities Japan’s growth presented for western companies, 
ensured that during the Uruguay round its delegation was brought into the core of 
GATT decision-making as a member of the quadrilateral group (more commonly 
known as the “quad”).  Japan’s entry into the “quad” was not, however, the 
consequence of a clear translation of rising economic power into core political 
influence.  Rather, it was part of a strategy on the part of the USA and the EU to force 
Japan to begin to open up closed aspects of its domestic markets in return for a 
measure of political influence in the Uruguay round.  Moreover, this elevated position 
lasted only as long as Japan’s markets (and the gains promised therein) were attractive.  
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It was inevitable, then, that when Japan’s economy went into relative decline after a 
decade of stagnation and amid the rise of other markets—particularly China—it would 
bring an end to its tenure at the core decision-making. 
 
China’s status quo-ism 
Japan’s experience in the GATT is far from an historical anomaly.  We can see familiar 
elements when we explore the impact of institutional factors in the role China’s has 
played in the multilateral trading system.  In exploring briefly the period since its 2001 
accession to the WTO we see China’s commercial diplomacy shaped by the manner in 
which it was first inculcated into the multilateral trading system.3  We also see China 
being brought into the core of decision-making at a crucial moment.  Yet, while its 
inclusion in the core of WTO decision-making was a recognition of its new found 
economic importance, it was also the result of a conscious decision by the established 
powers to use China’s inclusion as a means of generating forward movement in the as-
it-was-then stalled Doha round. 
 
From the very outset, China’s participation in the multilateral trading system has been 
shaped by a series of institutional factors.  Although it was in principle entitled to 
accede to the WTO as a developing country, China’s attempts to do so were blocked by 
the major trading powers.  Instead, it was required to give concessions that far exceeded 
both the obligations placed on other acceding developing countries as well as those of 
long-standing developing country members.  This was the case, for instance, in the 
requirement to eliminate all agricultural export subsidies (a concession to which the 
WTO’s existing members only agreed at the December 2015 Nairobi ministerial 
conference—see Wilkinson, Hannah and Scott, 2016) and in the binding of all of tariff 
lines at an average level lower than comparable developing countries.  
 
The concessions to which it was required to agree exerted a strong influence on China’s 
WTO trade diplomacy and helped shape a particular pattern of behaviour.  The 
accession protocols proved unpopular domestically and were perceived as being akin to 
the unequal treaties China was forced to enter into with the European powers and 
                                                 
3 This section develops aspects of Scott and Wilkinson, 2013. 
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Japan in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries (Loppacher and Kerr, 2005: 550).  
Yet, rather than seeking to use its growing economic might to bring about institutional 
change—in a loud echo of Japan’s case—China chose to undertake an extensive process 
of institutional learning and to use existing procedures to further its aims.   
 
If we look closely at the first 15 years of China’s participation in the multilateral trading 
system, two distinct phases of its trade diplomacy can be identified—an early phase 
dating from the point of accession in 2001 to early 2008, and then a later period from 
July 2008 to the present day.  These periods divide at the point at which China’s trade 
diplomacy is deemed by commentators to have moved from a relatively passive to a 
more aggressive mode (Bergsten, 2008; Gao, 2011) but which actually map on to what 
James Scott and I (2013) have argued is the growing socialisation of China into the 
multilateral trading system and a use of existing procedures to pursue its interests. 
 
In the first period we observed a trade diplomacy relatively low in profile—especially 
when compared with India and Brazil—with strong positions exerted only over the 
status of the Taiwanese delegation and the perceived over-intrusiveness of Transitional 
Review Mechanism (TRM) put in place to monitor China’s implementation of its 
accession agreements.  This initial period was entirely consistent with a process of 
institutional learning and adaptation.  It was perhaps also to be expected that, as China 
became more familiar with WTO practices, it would take on a more active role.  It is 
this move to a more active phase from July 2008 onwards that has prompted 
suggestions in the literature that China has become more aggressive and begun to show 
its real “intentions”.  Scott and I have argued otherwise.   
 
Exploring briefly two areas of activity enable us to see that rather than signalling a more 
aggressive system-challenging phase what actually resulted after July 2008 was more 
accurately a consolidation and acceleration of a behaviour mode set in motion by the 
manner in which China was inculcated into the institution.  In the manner in which 
China conducted itself in the Doha negotiations and in making important concessions 
on the issue of recently acceded members only behaviour that is consistent with the 
preservation of the status quo is observed.   
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In the years immediately following its accession—which map on perfectly to the opening 
phase of the Doha negotiations— China resisted participation in the established process 
of small-group meetings (known as “green room” session).  At the 2001 Doha 
ministerial conference, China witnessed (as an observer) the marathon green room 
discussions taking place in which developing country resistance to launch of what was 
to be the new round was slowly ground down through a process of attrition.  Seeing 
this process, China decided that when it joined the WTO it would not engage in the 
green room process with the result that when it was subsequently asked to attend small 
group meetings it initially refused—albeit that this position was later reviewed in 
response to requests from other developing countries. 
 
China played a key role in enabling a declaration to be adopted at the fractious 2005 
Hong Kong ministerial conference by talking round disgruntled Latin American 
developing countries from blocking the declaration (Wilkinson, 2006b).  Yet, despite 
the significance of its intervention China did not join the core decision-making group 
until July 2008 when it came together with the USA, EU, Japan, Australia, India and 
Brazil for a mini-ministerial meeting that most commentators suggest was both the 
closest the round came to a conclusion and the moment at which it broke down (see 
Narlikar and Tussie, this issue, for commentary on the role of shifts at the core of 
WTO decision-making and their role in Doha round deadlocks).  
 
What is clear is that the July 2008 mini-ministerial collapsed over the issue of the 
Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM—see Singh and Gupta, this issue, for further 
elaboration)—an element of the agriculture agreement that would, if agreed, provide 
developing countries with the capacity to raise tariffs when faced with a surge in 
imports that threatens the livelihoods of rural producers.  The principal division was 
between the USA, which wanted higher thresholds before the SSM could be used and 
lower permitted tariff increases, and India which wanted a more generous mechanism.  
China was blamed by US delegates and by the media for taking an intransigent position 
and standing with India against a deal.  However, interviews that Scott and I (2013) 
conducted with trade delegates and secretariat officials in the aftermath suggested that 
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this was an oversimplification.  China had not simply supported India’s position. 
Rather, it had attempted to broker a deal between India and the USA.  When this 
failed, China made it known that it would accept any compromise that the USA and 
India came to, but to no end.  What is clear from this pattern of events was that China 
was playing entirely within established rules and norms rather than seeking to 
circumscribe them. 
 
A second area where we can see China adopted a pragmatic, institutionally consistent 
line is in the issue of RAMs.  As it had only acceded to the WTO in 2001 (the year in 
which the Doha negotiations were launched), and the round was originally scheduled 
to reach a conclusion by 1st January 2005, China held that it should be allowed to 
agree to a less demanding package of commitments.  China’s position received little 
support, particularly from among the most WTO’s developed members. Yet, rather 
than taking a firm line and abstaining from the negotiations, China eventually showed 
flexibility.   This entailed accepting that it would have to implement the full extent of 
agreed tariff cuts, albeit with a longer implementation period—behaviour that was 
hardly consistent with a revisionist position. 
 
Nairobi, plus ça change 
What we have seen so far, then, is that across the broad history of the multilateral 
trading system a series of institutional factors have facilitated, shaped and mediated the 
“rise” of emerging powers.  These factors have helped socialise them into established 
ways of operating and allowed for some upward movement decision-making wise but 
ultimately left underlying relations of power untouched.  In this way, we see that 
emerging powers have contributed in some measure to bringing about changes in the 
multilateral trading system but they have been unable—and indeed have not sought—to 
alter fundamentally its basic structure.  What Narlikar and Tussie, and Singh and 
Gupta show in their papers is that one consequence of the growing involvement and 
elevation of emerging powers is that the Doha negotiations became contested and 
interspersed with protracted periods of deadlock.  As Narlikar and Tussie observe, this 
political jostling resulted in an outcome at the WTO’s December 2013 ministerial 
conference and a post-conference agreement in July 2014 that illustrated the new found 
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decision-making role of emerging powers generally and India in particular (see, also, 
Wilkinson, Hannah and Scott, 2014; Wilkinson, 2015). 
 
If what we have seen is a series of institutional factors that shape the behaviour of 
emerging powers such that they are socialised into the multilateral trading system in 
ways that mitigate system-challenging behaviour, how is their further rise prevented?   
One way is through their incorporation into a decision-making fora in a manner that 
recognises their significance in global trade but which does not offer them the kind of 
veto power that the USA and EU have.  Another is to change the terms of reference for 
negotiations such that they are effectively excluded.  The conclusion of the Uruguay 
round illustrates well how despite the inclusion of Japan and Canada as the other 
members of the quad, it was US and EU agreement that ultimately drew the round to a 
close (Wilkinson, 2006a: 91-93).  The deal brokered at the WTO’s December 2015 
Nairobi ministerial conference is the most recent example of a change in the terms of 
reference acting as an exclusionary device. 
 
While it is the case that India and China are now members of the Group of 5 key 
decision-makers in the WTO, the outcome of the organisation’s subsequent December 
2015 Nairobi ministerial conference has undermined the significance of that position 
installing a glass ceiling that has cut both out of having a major say in the post-Nairobi 
trade agenda. 4   The agreement reached in Nairobi transforms fundamentally the 
framework for conducting trade negotiations for the first time in the WTO’s history 
moving it away from one targeted at broad-based universal deals via a “single 
undertaking” as the Doha declaration had envisaged to something more lithe and 
multi-faceted.  This transformation was widely seen as a necessary component of 
rekindling faith in the organisation’s negotiating function and an important counter to 
“mega regional” trade deals such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).  However, reinvigorating the 
WTO’s negotiating function came at the expense of the Doha round and efforts to 
agree to a wide-ranging multilateral deal on trade measures for development that has 
                                                 
4 This section draws on Wilkinson, Hannah and Scott, 2016. 
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been a key demand of developing countries and which has been crucial to securing 
their participation in the multilateral trading system.   
 
Nairobi also saw members utilise a new mode of negotiation.  This new mode built 
consensus through a complex multi-layered series of bilateral processes in behind-the-
scenes meetings targeting the least contentious issues first, thereby generating 
willingness and committment before moving on to thornier topics.  Dubbed “critical 
mass” because of the broad-based participatory and consultative approaches that are key 
components, this method targeted blockages in the negotiations by encouraging 
counter-proposals and dialogue with opponents.  It was universally praised at the 
meeting and was seen as crucial in helping bridge the significant pre-ministerial gaps 
that had existed between members as well as to the conclusion of an agreement.  
Elements of this approach have been used before, and older more familiar small group 
and power-political methods were deployed in the closing stages of the ministerial 
conference.  Nonetheless, Nairobi witnessed the first time critical mass had been used 
as a wide-ranging mode of negotiation.  What is also clear is that while the package of 
trade measures agreed in Nairobi may have comprised agreements in agriculture and on 
least-developed country (LDC) issues as well as an expansion in the 1996 Information 
Technology Agreement (ITA) the balance of these measures clearly favoured the 
developed countries and continued the long-standing pattern of asymmetrical deals 
being negotiated. 
 
In combination, these outcomes mark the beginning of a critical juncture likely to 
signal a new phase in the evolution of the multilateral trading system.  While the use of 
a critical mass negotiating mode brought greater participation and consensus into the 
core of the Nairobi talks and was a clear advance over the conduct of previous 
negotiations, ironically it also resulted in an agreement that enabled the leading 
industrial members to move away from the pursuit of universal agreements wherein a 
balance of concessions is required that are acceptable to all members to one where they 
are more able to focus on narrow piecemeal deals and to exclude troublesome states.  
This approach to negotiating has a long-standing history in multilateral trade and its 
return signals a move back to a more “mini-lateral” exclusionary mode of agreeing trade 
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deals that were a feature prior to the Uruguay round (Wilkinson, 2006a).  It also sets 
aside the pursuit of single undertakings which, through the insistence on “nothing 
being agreed until everything is agreed”, was the primary means by which emerging 
powers were able to withstand and temper the ability of the USA and EU to dominate 
negotiations.  Moreover, the balance of the Nairobi package preserves a longstanding 
feature of GATT/WTO negotiations which has consistently seen deals struck that 
favour the organisation’s developed members.  The transformation of the WTO’s 
negotiating function into a more streamlined machinery is likely to preserve rather than 
attenuate this pattern. 
 
It is also noteworthy that Nairobi witnessed the grand and multiple coalitions evident 
during the earlier stages of the Doha negotiations—and which had evolved from the late 
GATT period—no longer have the same salience or traction that they had in previous 
ministerial conferences.  This is perhaps a consequence of the growing perception—as 
Singh and Gupta conclude (this issue)—that these coalitions have played a role in the 
deadlocks that have characterised the Doha round and which have contributed to the 
negotiations being set aside.  This is not to say that coalitions have disappeared (both 
the G33 and the Cairns group of agricultural exporting countries were active in Nairobi 
for instance).  Rather, it is to suggest that their cohesion may have been eroded by 
changes in the global economy and—on the part of lesser-developed, smaller, and more 
vulnerable members—a growing acceptance that it no longer makes sense to treat 
developing countries as one large group.   
 
Concluding comments 
Where does this leave us?  If we should take anything away from this concluding essay it 
is perhaps that a better appreciation of the mediating effect of institutions like the 
WTO is required to understand how and why emerging powers behave in the way that 
they do.  Of particular note is the impact of the socialisation of emerging powers—
current and historic—into the trade regime not only because it helps us understand 
better different forms of commercial diplomacy but also because it illustrates what is 
and what is not system-challenging behaviour.  It might also be worth noting that 
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institutions like the WTO have shown remarkable qualities in helping stabilise the 
relations of power that are their underpinnings.  
 
We now enter a period in which the future for the WTO and the multilateral trading 
system is unclear.  Most certainly the Nairobi outcome will energise the multilateral 
system by enabling the leading industrial states to pursue trade gains via plurilateral and 
other means.  In this, emerging powers will find themselves frozen out (as TPP does 
with regard to China in the Pacific) and/or isolated from the coalitions that were 
important in boosting their negotiating power in the Uruguay and Doha rounds.  The 
setting aside of the Doha round will also mean that there is now very little 
compunction for developed countries to focus on negotiations that are of specific 
interest to their developing—particularly their least developed—counterparts.  All we can 
now hope for is that members make good on their commitment to pursue development 
gains by means other than the Doha commitments and that a process of reform is put 
in place that alters fundamentally how trade gains are distributed by the multilateral 
system (Wilkinson, 2014b).  Yet, what we also know from the history of the multilateral 
trading system is that it has so far proven remarkably resilient to change.  Even when 
confronted with significant internal shifts in power relations among member states 
neither reform, nor development gain for its own sake, has been forthcoming.  Perhaps 
it is time to look elsewhere. 
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